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### THE KREMLIN "PEACE OFFENSIVE"

Despite the recently headlined Kremlin "peace offensive," continued Soviet-Communist pressures and expansion in various parts of the world indicate that any "softening" by the Soviet Union should be regarded only as a temporary tactical adjustment and not as a prelude to a sweeping revision of Soviet policy toward the west. The USSR apparently now intends to exploit the US refusal to engage in bilateral negotiations on Germany as a further example of US insincerity in the quest for world peace.

**Western Europe** Soviet pressure continues unabated in western Europe. In France, the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor, which called the still unsettled coal strike and which is campaigning for rotation strikes in other industries, admitted publicly that groups of miners in the USSR and its Satellites were providing funds to finance idle strikers. In the western zones of Germany, the Communists are organizing youth and factory cells in preparation for increased agitation. In Austria, Soviet occupation authorities recently sought to counteract slowly improving economic conditions by demanding another allotment of locomotives and rolling stock as war booty. This action, combined with recent Soviet success in intimidating Austrian officials by arresting a number of Austrian citizens, may lead Austria to waver in its cooperation with the western powers.

**Near East** The return of Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov to Tehran may presage a renewed campaign against the US arms program and US military missions in Iran. The latest incident in the Soviet "war of nerves" is the occupation by the USSR of a strip of territory claimed by Iran and located along the Soviet border east of the Caspian Sea. Soviet pressure

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**"PEACE OFFENSIVE"**

will probably be restricted to demands for an oil concession in Iran and repeated charges that US military aid violates the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship.

**Japan** As a part of expanding operations in the Far East, the USSR has increased its activity and interest in Japanese affairs. Molotov's recent reiteration of Kremlin interest in the early conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty may be the beginning of a propaganda campaign designed to harass US occupation authorities. In late September, the USSR again requested that "those powers most interested" be authorized by the Far Eastern Commission to exercise international controls over Japanese industry which would extend beyond those established by a formal peace treaty. The Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan has also been sharply critical of both the Japanese Government and SCAP during the past three months. As one measure of Soviet intent in the Far East, radio transmitting facilities of several Siberian broadcasting stations beaming propaganda to Japan have been strengthened so that virtually any standard Japanese radio set can pick up the signal.

**China** Advance propaganda announcements by prominent Chinese Communists suggest that the USSR is preparing the way for more active participation in Chinese affairs. In the most recent announcement, Liu Shao-chi, member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, attempted in a radio commentary to prove that Chinese patriotism was not incompatible with "proletarian internationalism." Although the philosophical subtleties of Liu's reasoning will largely escape the rank and file of Chinese Communists, this public acknowledgment of Soviet primacy in the conduct of local Communist Party affairs probably represents the beginning of a Soviet-sponsored "educational" campaign to prepare the Chinese for a dominating role by the USSR in China.

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## UNITED NATIONS

**Berlin Dispute** The Lie-Evatt appeal for the resumption of four-power talks on Berlin, despite its apparent conciliatory attitude toward the USSR, was designed primarily to focus attention once more on the gravity of the Berlin deadlock and thus set the stage for a new compromise proposal by the SC neutrals. If the neutrals can devise a ready-made currency plan to be put into effect simultaneously with the lifting of the blockade, the USSR will be unable to base its objections, as it did in the first proposal of the neutral nations, on the lack of "simultaneity." By depriving the USSR of this technical excuse for blocking settlement of the Berlin problem, such a proposal will somewhat improve chances for four-power agreement. On the other hand, if the USSR should veto any new proposal which provided for adequate four-power control of the Berlin currency, the Kremlin's real intentions in Berlin would be unmasked.

**Korean Case** The UN General Assembly will now probably recognize the Rhee regime in South Korea as the national Korean government. Small-power opposition to Soviet tactics is stiffening and the USSR has little chance of gaining GA recognition of the Communist government in North Korea. Rather than approve a possible Soviet compromise proposal for federation of the northern and southern regimes, the GA is likely to order the return of a UN commission to Korea charged with responsibility for seeking a formula for the incorporation of North Korea into the UN-recognized national government. Such a commission would also act as a deterrent to Communist violence. UN handling of the Korean problem may be further complicated by Soviet propaganda exploitation of a probable request by the South Korean Government or a friendly power for retention of US occupation troops until the South Korean military establishment is capable of withstanding Communist pressures from the north or from a Communist China.

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